Theses on the 2019 General Election

Here is my attempt to cast some light on the General Election defeat.  I’ve written it as a set of “theses” to try and make the fairly complex argument concise.  I haven’t covered everything and some of this has already been said (I’ve linked some of those pieces), but here I’m trying to put together a number of frameworks for understanding.  I also suggest three things that Labour will simultaneously need to do to rebuild.  Insights from community psychology, decolonial thought, and ecosocialism should be obvious enough.  It does need a more thorough Marxian grounding, and I’ve not covered the economics of Labour’s policy platform, but that’s for another day.

  1. Labour lost because of a combination of factors.

  2. The Tory victory was a resurgence of the dominant English nationalism, what Tom Nairn, in a prescient article from 1977, called “Patrician Liberalism”.

  3. That resurgence was made possible by the steady erosion of the Labour movement’s industrial base, which led to the weakening and loss of labour movement institutions, together with the ways of living that created and maintained approximations of socialist consciousness. As Paul Mason summarises it (and you don’t have to accept his entire argument,In the end, we lost because part of the former industrial working class in the Midlands and the North has detached itself from the values that are now core to our party. That is the result of a decades long process, which began under Tony Blair,and was never going to be turned around in six weeks.” Callum Cant and Aditya Chakrabortty make similar arguments.

  4. The capture of the Labour Party by the insurgent left, meant that an internationalist, metropolitan, and largely University educated movement became the dominant culture, identity and activist membership. That constituency found it difficult to communicate to the “patriotic” (English nationalist), small c conservative, working class of the de-industrial areas. Instead, the simplistic, nationalist messages of the Tory/Brexit party machine, the illiberal, Patriotic right, the patrician (economic) liberals, of whom the paradigm example is “Boris” Johnson, found an easier resonance. Corbyn himself, the accidental leader, who also represents that internationalist socialist orientation, came unstuck in just the same way; this was why there was the typically unarticulated rejection of the “unpatriotic” man as future Prime Minister – the same thing that I experienced with regard to the more emollient Michael Foot (a left liberal / moral socialist if ever there was one), canvassing in 1983, again with an impressively transformative, and largely unread, manifesto.

  5. In that competition of ideologies, the easy option of blaming the foreigner, of pulling up the drawbridge, won out over the more complex, evidence-based and nuanced internationalist socialism of the revived Labour Party. In this way, it was indeed the Brexit election, not the Climate election, nor even the economic justice election.

  6. Despite this, this election was fought less on an overt racist platform than the EU referendum. That does not make the underpinning dynamic any less racist: the racism was unspoken. To examine this a little more, the assumption that England is somehow superior, is well ingrained. It depends on a history of colonial pillage and subsidy, that from the second half of the C19 benefited even the industrial proletariat. The erosion of the UK’s industrial base was possible, in part because of the subsidy from the colonies, and via the financial transactions of the City of London. The temporary subsidy of North Sea Oil also masked the decline in the UK’s industrial base. Sad to say, the colonial imaginary is also present, in a muted form, in Corbynite economic thinking too: Tony Norfield’s concept of national welfarism is relevant here, as are recent decolonial critiques of the Green Deal, for example that from Asad Rehman.

  7. The erosion of the industrial base was also facilitated by reforms enacted by the neoliberal turn, which exacerbated the foot-looseness of capital in general and UK capital in particular.

  8. The electoral difficulties of the British Labour Party also reflect the decline in support for social democratic parties across Europe, and beyond. Those difficulties have been masked by the First Past the Post system and by the leftward turn which meant that young militants in England joined labour whereas in continental Europe they would likely have joined Die Linke, Podemos, la France Insoumise, or Syriza.

  9. The counterfactual cases of Scotland, and Merseyside, are consistent with the Nairn thesis on English nationalism and the dominance of patrician liberalism. In Scotland there is an alternative yet broadly social democratic nationalism, one that is not attached to the imperial project of the England-Britain. The Merseyside case is different, but still live traditions of working class struggle (and a rejection of the Murdoch press) combine with a distinctive not very English cultural mix, making this struggling city more similar in political consciousness to that of the metropolitan progressive cities London, Bristol and Manchester.

  10. Labour is fundamentally an electoral machine. That does not mean that there aren’t good branches doing excellent campaigning and community-strengthening work. Nor doe it mean that there aren’t excellent examples of Labour administrations with innovative approaches to building resilient communities and local economies (Preston Labour’s community wealth building is a well known example. Hackney’s ambitious and well thought out work on greening the borough is less well known). However, Labour is still overwhelmingly an electoral machine, with its activists foot soldiers for winning elections. Of course elections are vitally important but the disillusioned voters of the former “Red Wall” postindustrial towns can hardly be blamed for thinking “it’s all very well you coming and asking for our votes but where have you been in the meantime?”

  11. In order to rebuild its mass support, Labour needs to simultaneously do several things. I suggest that these can all take place together, mutually supporting one another. That is the simultaneous construction of movement and counter-hegemonic ideology: that is, an organising set of understandings and a vision that re-interprets the world, making sense to people with diverse starting points, because it builds on what they know and experience already, adding in an organising narrative that is binding and hopeful. That has a number of components.

  12. It must be rooted, or grounded, in practical solidarity, basically community work, helping people, finding solutions, fighting exploiters.

  13. It must be imaginative: the ways of doing this won’t be the same as those of yesterday. The patterns of community life, the economic, social and environmental challenges are different and so are some of the tools that are now available.

  14. It must respond to the new challenge that will become ever more dominant, that of the climate and ecological crisis. That means tackling cold houses while expending less energy, building economic alternatives close to where people live, shock-proofing provisioning, particularly food and heat, and finding ways to use less and less energy. If we stumble into a civilisational collapse, then at least make it less dire than it might be otherwise.

Posted in climate change, coloniality, culture, ecology, politics | Tagged , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Things I’ve written lately, mostly elsewhere.

I’m rather aware that I’ve been neglecting this blog lately.  It’s not because I’ve been inactive, the opposite, in fact.  So here is a list of the most important things I’ve written over the last year and a bit.

“Properly” published stuff:

Kagan, C. M., Burton, M., Duckett, P., Lawthom, R., &Book cover
Siddiquee, A. (October, 2019). Critical Community Psychology: Critical Action and Social Change. (2nd Edn.). London: Routledge.

Burton, M. (2019). Degrowth: The realistic alternative for Labour.
Renewal, 27(2), 88–95. (now open access)

NLR 115 coverBurton, M., & Somerville, P. (2019). Degrowth: A Defence.
New Left Review
, (115), 95–104. Versión En español.

Burton, M. and Guzzo, R. (in press). Liberation Psychology: origins and development.
In L Diaz Comas and E Torres (Eds.) Liberation Psychology: Theory, Method, Practice, and Social Justice. To be published by Springer, North America.  Copy on request

Other pieces:

Six problems for Green Deals (12 September, 2019) Steady State Manchester.   A talk given as part of the panel session on The Economics of Climate Emergency, at Manchester Metropolitan University’s launch event for the Future Economies Research Centre.  Also available here at
Spanish translation here /Traducción a castellano-enlace

The new municipalists defeated in several Spanish cities. Posted on 27 May, 2019, here on Uncommontater.

Do More, Faster! Greater Manchester Climate campaigners call for serious climate action. Posted on 25 March, 2019 ,Steady State Manchester.

Steady State Manchester’s response to the 2019 Greater Manchester Spatial Framework  Posted on 15 March, 2019  Steady State Manchester.

What Kind of a Green Deal? The implications of material and monetary flows. (28 February, 2019)  Steady State Manchester.  This article has been syndicated at
This article has been syndicated at, and Enjeux énergies et environement

What’s gone wrong in Venezuela? Posted on 11 January, 2019, here on Uncommontater.

Manchester’s Climate Change Strategy: All CO2 and mirrors? (12 December, 2018) Steady State Manchester.

An economy that does not grow?(9 November, 2018) Steady State Manchester.
Also at and in Spanish at Revoprosper.

Earlier but significant work:
We need to end growth dependency, but how? 23 February, 2018 (A Critique of Positive Money‘s proposals). Steady State Manchester.
This article is now also available at Resilience and in Spanish translation, in two parts at Revo – prosperidad sostenible: Part 1, and Part 2.

After Peak Capitalism: The livelihood challenge.  On Uncommontater. November, 2017.



Posted in climate change, ecology, economics, Latin America, Manchester, politics, psychology, social policy, Spain | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The new municipalists defeated in several Spanish cities.

Updated re Barcelona, Sept 2019.

Here is a summary of the major results for the “Cities of Change” (or Fearless Cities / cover of book on the global movement of new municipalism - Fearless Cities, Spanish editionCiudades sin Miedo), where the insurgent, new municipalist, left gained power, in 2014. Most of these innovative coalitions have been defeated by the more traditional Spanish Socialist Workers Party, the PSOE (somewhat similar to the UK Labour Party) or in the case of Barcelona by the forces of the nationalist left (Catalan Republican Party, ERC) and the PSOE allied Catalan Socialist Party (PSC). In Madrid, although the radical Más Madrid grouping got the largest share of the vote, this was insufficient, even with the support of the PSOE and Podemos, to yield a majority of councillors. So the right, led by the Popular Party will now take over with support from Ciudadanos (opportunistic centre right) and Vox (neo-Falangists).

Against this disappointing set of results, the new municipalists in Cadíz and Valencia increased their support, despite the advances of the PSOE.

There are many reasons for these results, and they differ from place to place. In Madrid, the advance of the PSOE, together with in-fighting on the left is mostly responsible. A disastrous decision of Podemos was to support leftists who split from Carmena’s coalition and campaigned separately as Madrid en Pie, gaining no seats but 2.6% of the vote. That’s not to say Carmena’s city government was free from mistakes but factionalism has yielded defeat for the left. In Barcelona, Ada Colau and Barcelona en Comú’s principled stance on Catalan independence against both Catalan and Spanish nationalists (that people have the right to vote on the matter but BeC did not support the secessionists) and calls for dialogue will not have helped her.  However it remains unclear whether she will have to relinquish to position of mayor (see below).

In all the cities, the newness of the PSOE government and the (somewhat) leftward and green turn under Pedro Sánchez will also have led to former PSOE voters returning to the fold.

A summary of the principal municipal results is given in the table below.

Meanwhile in the European election, of those parties gaining representation, the PSOE gained 32.56% of the vote, the PP 19.95%, Ciudadanos 12.06%, Podemos and allies 9.96%, Vox 6.14, the republican left 5.56, right wing secessionists 4.54 and the liberal CEUS 2.8%.

City Change Comment
Madrid Más Madrid lost to the right.

Mayor Manuela Carmena unseated.

While Más Madrid gained most votes, the left vote was split by the candidature of former aliies now in Madrid en Pie which gained no seats. The seats of Más Madrid and PSOE together were insufficieint to prevent an unholy alliance of PP, Ciudadanos (Cs) and Vox unseating the radical mayor, Manuela Carmena.
Zaragoza Zaragoza en Común lost to the PSOE.

Mayor Pedro Santiesteve unseated.

Competition between Zaragoza en Común and Podemos led to ZeC getting just 3 seats, and Podemos 2 ,on the council. As the largest party PSOE will now take the city, although with support from the smaller left groupings.
Barcelona Barcelona en Comú pipped in terms of votes by the ERC.

Ada Colau congratulated ERC leader Maragall but could still retain the mayoralty.

UPDATE:  Ada Colau was able to form a minority administration with the  PCS and the passive support of Manuel Valls, former French Socialist Party PM who allied with Cs for the elections but subsequently broke ranks with them to enable Colau to take the mayoralty while blocking the independentistas (he was also appalled by Cs alliance with the far right elsewhere).

The Catalan nationalist left party ERC might takes over the city, on the basis of a slightly greater number of votes, though the same number of seats as BeC.  However its leader gave a victory speech that emphasised Catalan independence which is not supported by either BeC or PCS (the Catalan Socialist Party, allied to the PSOE).  As Colau says, Barcelona is a city of the left, not of independence.  Maragall wants to ally with the neoliberal secessionists but can’t form a majority. So the situation as of 28 may is unclear.  Colau could form a minority administration with PCS but would need tacit support from outside the coalition from Ciudadanos. BeC stood for dialogue in the Catalan independence conflict, against both Catalan and Spanish nationalists.
Santiago, A Coruña, Ferrol Marea Galicia lost all three cities to the PSOE.
Martiño Noriega, Xulio Ferreiro and Jorge Suárez unseated.
Valencia Compromís retained the city.

Joan Ribó continues as mayor.

Compromís strengthened its position despite increase in vote for PSOE
Cadíz Adelante Cadíz retained the city.

José María González ‘Kichi’ continues as mayor.

Adelante Cadíz strengthened its position, to one short of an overall majority. Podemos was part of this alliance.


Posted in politics, Spain | Tagged , | 1 Comment

What’s gone wrong in Venezuela?

What’s gone wrong in Venezuela?

Mark H Burton1

pdf version

[Update, 3 Feb, 2019: Some additional recent English language sources appear at the end – not in the pdf version yet.]

This piece is intended as a guide to what’s gone wrong with Venezuela’s “Bolivarian process”. That process, associated with the leadership of the late Hugo Chávez Frias, has divided opinion, not just in Venezuela but also beyond. Too often commentary has fallen into one of two camps, either uncritical support for what appeared to offer hope to progressives and leftists, that a democratic process could lead to a just transformation, or opposition to what is seen as the imposition of a near dictatorship with economic, civil and political freedoms severely curtailed. The truth is more complex and I will try to cut through the ideological polarisation, to explore what has happened, and indeed what has gone wrong.

I write from the position of an ecological leftist, with an interest in social movements as a transformative force and resource for moving to a better society. I have some direct knowledge of Venezuela, having visited twice, before and after the election of Chávez, and more importantly having friends and colleagues there. My involvement with colleagues has included collaborative work that has included an analysis of disability policy in Venezuela and writing a commentary on a collection of articles on community social psychology in the country. Many of these people have been at best sceptical of the government’s “Bolivarian revolution” and in many cases altogether hostile. Some of these people have now left the country, chiefly for economic reasons. I have also had contact with supporters of the process, from inside and outside the country, largely as a result of my own commitment to solidarity with the Cuban revolution. I also wrote a study (in Spanish) of the coverage of Venezuela in the liberal Western press, commissioned by supporters of the Bolivarian revolution for a project that never saw the light of day.

With this background, then, we can immediately say two things. One the one hand, I am no friend of the Venezuelan right and the middle classes who have supported it, who have implacably resisted any encroachment on their privilege, resorting to violence and illegal means to try and overthrow the elected government and its attempts at social transformation. On the other hand, I do not take at face value the claims of those on the left who (at least in public) see nothing wrong with the Venezuelan government and its Bolivarian revolution, defending all its moves.

I will assume some basic knowledge of the Venezuelan process and the key events.

The Bolivarian project

The Bolivarian project of Chávez was significant because after the collapse of alternatives to the capitalist system, and the triumph of the neoliberal version, under a unipolar US-led global settlement (the Washington consensus2) not least throughout Latin America (with the exception of Cuba), it showed the possibility of a democratically elected government making broad transformations that contradicted and reversed the premises and impositions of that system. Venezuela had, under the “punto fijo” system that followed the dictatorship of he 1950s, had alternating rule by centre-right and centre-left parties with a system of patronage and corruption, dependent on oil revenues, that left some 80% of the population marginalised: this could be seen in the cities with the majority living in shanty towns, the barrios composed of “ranchitos”, shacks, very often perched perilously on unstable hillsides, without basis amenities and services. The dominance of the oil industry led to productive and agricultural capacity of the country being seriously limited, a manifestation of the so-called “Dutch disease”.

On his election in 1998, Chávez implemented his promise to re-write the constitution via a Constituent Assembly. This new constitution was envisaged as refounding he republic (with its new name, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela). It strengthened democracy, for example by instituting the provision for the recall of elected representatives, including the president. It enacted legislation to recognise the country’s indigenous peoples and their rights, including their lands. Environmental protections were enacted. Land titles were made available to squatters. An alliance was created with Cuba whereby thousands of health workers and educationalists began to work in the poor barrios throughout the country, providing access to health care and supporting the “Yo Sí Puedo” literacy programme, and Cuba was able to purchase oil at advantageous rates. Later on, the government initiated a house building programme and invested in co-operatives. In addition to the reform of representative democracy, with a new National Assembly, community and participative democracy was also promoted.

Edgar Lander3 sees the significance of the Bolivarian process of the early Chávez years, for the rethinking of the socialist project, in terms of four signals, also reflected in parallel developments under the progressive governments of Ecuador and Bolivia:

  1. The political dynamic that led to these new governments was not led by political parties but by a wide and heterogeneous diversity of social movements, peoples and communities.

  2. A debate was opened about development, and concerning other ways of relating human beings to nature or Mother Earth. In Ecuador and Bolivia, the rights of nature were recognised for the first time constitutionally or legally.

  3. Plurality of nations and cultures, the recognition and celebration of the rich diversity of peoples, communities, traditions and of memories present in these societies, despite five centuries of authoritarian monocultural colonial States.

  4. In Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, the concepts of participative and community democracy were included in the constitutions. It is significant that these modes of democracy are not conceived as alternatives (or substitutes) for representative democracy, but as forms for deepening, for radicalising democracy.

Particularly once Chávez was temporarily ousted by a coup and then restored by loyal sections of the military, supported by popular mobilisation, his cause became popular in broad sections of the international left. The implication of the Bush regime in the coup, and in continued covert attempts to undermine the legitimate government, only strengthened this support. With the arrival of apparently leftward leaning governments in many American countries, it looked like this wave could be unstoppable, giving the oppressed across the worked great hope. However, there were voices, from those whose commitment to community empowerment and social justice was unquestioned, who saw Chávez as an authoritarian bully and who questioned the degree to which the supposed changes were being reflected on the ground. Personally, I was prepared to give the Bolivarian revolution, and the associated developments in other countries, the benefit of the doubt. Even when I visited Bolivia in 2012, I was unconvinced by the criticisms of the government there from some sections. However, it was explained to me that the MAS, the ruling party of Evo Morales, and the alliance of social movements, were split between two orientations, the fairly standard, desarrollista (developmentalist) current, which saw the expansion of the economy, harnessing Bolivia’s mineral wealth, as the route to social and environmental justice and even environmental sustainability, and the Pachamamista (Mother Nature) current, that took seriously the commitment to the rights of nature and the indigenous-influenced concept of vivir bien (suma qamaña in Aymara, translated as living well, but closer to the idea of “right livelihood” or “commonweal”). The desarrollistas were increasingly dominant. Subsequent events have clearly demonstrated this. Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador have all abandoned their earlier commitment to the protection of the ecosystem and infringed their own constitutions, emblematically in the Arco Mineral del Orinoco, Tipnis and Yasuní, respectively.

Up until 2014, it was possible to hold on to the idea that Venezuela would “come through” as a possible, if flawed, model. By now, only the most delusional supporters can believe that. The evidence is clear, the Bolivarian process has failed, leading to economic collapse, authoritarian and unconstitutional rule, and real suffering for the mass of the people who supported the revolution.

What went wrong?

It is not easy to find detailed and critical analysis of the Venezuelan collapse. An article by the LSE’s Asa Cusack in English is one of the few4 (Cusack is also the author and editor of two forthcoming books on ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the alternative regional alliance established by Venezuela and Cuba). A more detailed analysis, in Spanish, is provided by the Venezuela Central University scholar, Edgar Lander in a series of articles. I have used his analysis in what follows5, supplementing it with other information and perspectives. It contains elements found in Cusack’s paper but is located within the critical post-development and decolonial tradition, allied to the Pachamamista tendency in the Andean countries and to the international degrowth movement too. It is therefore informed by an opposition to the extractivism that has characterised Latin America from the colonial period to the present day. I will set out the key points of the analysis. I have reworked the points made by Lander and others into seven categories, but these inevitably overlap and influence one another; this complicates the search for final causes of the failed experiment. Much of this analysis is critical of the Bolivarian process, especially as it has evolved under Maduro but I am far more critical of the right wing opposition within the country and the USA’s efforts from the start to defeat the Bolivarian experiment (see section 7).

1) The failure to escape dependence on oil extraction.

Venezuela is a “petroState” and has been so from long before the Chávez presidency. In 1998, oil exports were 68.7% of total exports. By 2013, they had reached 96%6. Over the same period, the value of non-oil exports has fallen, as has the contribution of non-oil industries to the economy.

Oil revenues have been the means to fund redistributive social policies and to maintain support for the government: it seems likely that these priorities have eclipsed the alternative of reducing dependence on oil, and restructuring the economy. While maintaining a radical discourse in the UN negotiations on climate change, the country has tried to increase its oil production (although it has failed in this). In the Plan de la Patria, presented by Chávez for the 2012 elections, objective 5 is To preserve life on the planet and save the human species, while objective 3 is To consolidate the role of Venezuela as a world energy power.

Chávez did have the idea of diversifying the economy, relying particularly on the construction of micro-enterprises and cooperatives but as the above figures indicate, little was actually achieved. The attempt to replicate “mechanically” the achievements of existing cooperatives, that had evolved over decades, had little success and the presence of corruption and clientalism and a lack of management capacity on the part of State institutions were further factors7.

Under Chávez’s successor, Nicolás Maduro, the attempt to capitalise on the country’s natural resources has accelerated with the Orinoco Mineral Arc programme. This designates a region of Venezuela’s largest State, Estado Bolivar, 111.843 sq km, or 12.2% of the national territory, the size of Cuba or Portugal, for the exclusive extraction of minerals, under the overall control of the army. It was anticipated that, with the invitation to mining companies from around the world to exploit the reserves (which include coltan, aluminium, diamonds, radioactive minerals and especially gold) there would be enormous investments: these have not materialised and the project has become a drain on the country’s oil revenues. The region falls within the international pan-Amazon region, a region of enormous biodiveristy and strategic significance for moderation of the planet’s climate. The socio-ecological (including the economic) value of the region’s resources is far greater than the value of the minerals that could be exploited (70% of the country’s hydroelectic power depends on the waters from this region). It is also home to the Warao, E ́Ñepa, Hoti, Pumé, Mapoyo, Kariña, Piaroa, Pemón, Ye ́kwana and Sanema peoples whose livelihoods would be devasted by large scale mineral extraction: it means that they are threatened with ethnocide. Established by an unconstitutional presidential decree, opposition to extractive projects in the zone is largely prohibited. It has also become a lawless zone, where illegal mining of gold and coltan has expanded vertiginously, with the recruitment of thousands of miners. Armed groups, originating from both sides in the Colombian conflict, and criminal bands control different sectors and fix the prices for the miners. All this is with the complicity of members of the country’s armed forces. The risk (likely already a reality) is of a link up between illegal mining interests and government officials. The large scale use of mercury by miners working with no protection has been documented in the extraction of gold, and mercury has been found in harmful concentrations in the bodies of mothers and children in the region8.

The Orinoco Mineral Arc illustrates the bankruptcy of the extractivist model, that far from enabling a transition from primary materials production for the global market while maintaining redistributive policies, deepens the country’s dependence on global commodity markets while destroying the country’s most important assets and precipitating sections of the population into a criminalised, impoverished and unprotected labour force.

That dependence of the extractivist economy on global commodity markets, and its vulnerability to their vagaries can be seen in the impact of global oil prices on Venezuela’s economy. Oil prices, however, while an important factor, do not account for the economic crisis that the country finds itself in. The price per barrel, around $100 from 2012-2014, fell to an average of $41 in 2015. However, as the following chart9 illustrates, prices are now in the range that they were during the first 6 or 7 years of the Chávez administration. It has, however, been estimated that Venezuela needs an oil price of around $117 to break even10.

World crude oil prices, corrected for inflation.11

Venezuela has tried to pump more and more oil to get over this problem, but it has failed in this, with production continuing to plummet. The goal for 2019 is for production of 6M barrels but production has fallen from a peak of 3.39M barrels in 2008 to an annualised rate of 1.14M by December 201812. Lander explains the collapse in these terms:

As well as external factors [a portion of the State oil company PDVSA’s income is being used to pay off debts incurred, principally to China and Russia] … the following are notable: the managerial incapacity that leads to inefficiency and improvisation, corruption, the scandalous overpricing in its operations, the continued drain of qualified staff and the limited investments in maintenance and technology. The distribution of petrol almost free of charge in the internal market, and the massive smuggling and pilfering of its products that this generates, implies national budgetary losses of millions of dollars per year. The process of de-capitalisation to which the national executive has subjected PDVSA has been systematic, obliging the company to deliver its hard currency to the Central Bank at an exchange prate that represents an extraordinary and unsustainable overvaluation of the bolivar [the national currency]. To continue operating, from 2017, the company began a process of increasing external borrowing. In 2017 it already owed a total of 71 Million dollars, debt that the company has no capacity to pay, which means a default is dangerously imminent which would put at risk its installations overseas, especially its USA subsidiary CITGO.”13

This risk to overseas assets has already been encountered, with seizure of PDVSA facilities May 2018 when in U.S. oil firm ConocoPhillips won court orders releasing the Venezuelan company’s key Caribbean operations, where PDVSA used to ship large consignments to Asia. This loss of access has led to congestion at Venezuela’s ports14, compounding the export problem.

Meanwhile the government’s investment priority ha been in heavy oil in the Orinoco region. The return on investment ratio is poor, since it requires such large inputs to process this oil – a problem already affecting Venezuela’s mainstream production (although to a lesser degree).

So the country has not escaped oil dependency, instead increasing its reliance on primary resource extraction. As such it is subject to the vagaries of international commodity prices, in any case a problem given the relatively high break-even price for Venezuelan oil15. This has been compounded by corruption and the mismanagement of the national oil company, both by the government and by its own management meaning that production and exports have slumped restricting investment and maintenance, meaning that the country’s income from oil has also slumped, just as its reliance on it has increased.

2) Mistakes in financial management.

A key problem has been that of exchange rates. The bolivar is seriously overvalued. This means that home production is expensive, so production for export is disincentivised while imports have been cheap. Although there are controls on access to foreign currency, there is an incentive to circumvent these, leading to a black market in dollars. Local businesses were thereby undermined while corruption increased, affecting both individuals and organisations. This leads to the phenomenon of “currency arbitrage”. Cusack explains it in this way:

The wider the gap between the official and black-market exchange rates, the greater the incentive to get hold of cheap official-rate dollars and resell them on the black market (“currency arbitrage”). The wider the gap between the prices of oil or foodstuffs in Venezuela and neighbouring countries, the greater the incentive to smuggle these products across the border for resale.
Differences in price are captured privately at the state’s expense while producing nothing, which in turn leaves fewer resources available for the everyday business of running the country16.

Chávez had devalued the bolivar temporarily when faced with this problem of divergence of black market and official exchange rates. Maduro has not countenanced doing this. Moreover, there are multiple official exchange rates affecting different sectors of the economy. The criticism of these policies has not just come from the right wing opposition. The finance minister Jorge Giordani resigned due to Maduro’s economic mismanagement and the left opposition Marea Socialista has also called for changes to monetary policy, as well as other reforms17. In their own investigation, covering the years 1998 to 2013, Marea Socialista estimated rates of between 12.3 and 46.7% annual flight of oil revenues, equivalent to ten times the loss sustained during the right wing sabotage (the lock out) of 2002/2003, lost to the country’s budgets18. Giordani estimated the loss of approximately $300bn in the 7 year period to 2012 from currency arbitrage19. Hector Navarro, a founder of the ruling Unified Socialist party but expelled in 2014, was a minister under Chávez. He joined Giordani in the criticism of the Maduro regime’s corrupt rule.

Of course it does not help that Venezuela’s foreign debt is denominated in the US dollar20: this is not Venezuela’s choice and it has been involved in a number of alternatives to create an alternative. It also gives the US immense power over the country’s economy.

3) Political weakness: the reliance on charismatic leadership and the weakness of popular democracy.

The fatal political weakness of the Bolivarian experiment has been its reliance on a single charismatic leader. That is not to say that social movements have been absent, but it was the extraordinary ability of Chávez to bring currents together, overcoming lethargy and apathy and articulate the direction of travel. The downside was the marginalisation of critical voices and the consequent lack of open debate: this was undoubtedly reinforced by the intransigent and delinquent opposition from the right and their international allies, supported by the world’s liberal media. But the consequence was an impoverishment of the revolution’s political culture and the loss of the ability to identify problems and self-correct strategic mistakes. The untimely death of Chávez in 2013 coincided with the deepening of the economic crisis when oil prices fell. Maduro lacks both the personal charisma of his predecessor and the popular affection Chávez enjoyed. This has accentuated the recourse to authoritarian rulings including the sacking of judges, the unconstitutional replacement of the National Assembly (when the government lost its majority), postponement of State elections, imprisonment of opposition politicians (not all of whom are clearly criminal) and rule by decree. The liberal press used to accuse Chávez of dictatorial tendencies. This was untrue: democracy was initially strengthened, with a variety of innovations for participative democracy, including community councils and transparency in elections. The claim has in the case of Maduro. However, it is arguable that there was always a tension between the democratic impulse and the left “caudillismo” exercised by Chávez while the bureaucratic and corrupt nature of the State, impaired by the unwillingness of some of its functionaries to implement reforms, meant that these new institutions were frustrated from delivering for their constituents.

4) A overly statist model of transformation: the emptiness of the supposed “21st Century socialism” alternative.

On the left, in Venezuela and worldwide, there have, since the 1960s, been wide-ranging debates about the nature of socialism. One theme has been the limitations of identifying socialism with the State, and of the implementation of socialism from above. At the same time, it is clear enough that an over-emphasis on bottom-up governance and innovation is likely to fail. In the Bolivarian process, there was a tension between,

…the imaginaries and practices of popular power and self-organisation from below, one the one hand, and Leninist-inspired politics of control from above and the taking of all the principal decisions from the centre of the party-State, which are then communicated to the population via simultaneous radio and television broadcasts. In this way confidence in the capabilities of self-government by the organised people has been undermined. In this period there has been a strong contradiction between the setting up and promotion of multiple forms of popular base organisation and the establishment of structures of vertical control of these organisations, and by the same token, the generation of a permanent financial dependency on the State, undermining the autonomous possibilities of these organisations.”21

Thus, despite a genuine desire to develop a different model, a 21st Centrury socialism, a more traditional, centralised Statist approach has predominated. A contributory factor was the obstruction of the Chávez reforms by those in the State apparatus inherited from the previous governments. This led the government to establish, often in a somewhat improvised and informal manner, parallel institutions, strengthening the rule of the centre without checks and balances while failing to address the incapacity of the government bureaucracy to implement and monitor policy implementation. In a society where corruption was widespread, it also strengthened the practice of clientalism – the distribution of services and benefits according to loyalties. As a result, some social policies did not reach those that they were intended to.

The idea of 21st Century Socialism became something of a rallying cry, particularly in Latin America. What it meant was somewhat more difficult to pin down but it could be thought of as a kind of leftist Third Way: neither the State socialism of the former soviet block nor capitalism. It would combine a participative democracy and economic democracy, with an emphasis on cooperatives and community-based enterprises. However, its lack of clear definition led to its use as a slogan rather than as either a theoretical framework of strategic orientation. At this point in time it seems a somewhat empty slogan, despite the validity of its critique of previous social models. More worryingly its vagueness allows it to be used to justify a variety of dubious political arrangements.

The situation is further compounded in Venezuela by the involvement of military personnel at all levels of government activity: in early 2017, 34% of Maduro’s cabinet were serving or retired military officers. This was partly attributable to the background and networks of Hugo Chávez but also again to the obstruction to the reform process by the right wing opposition.

5) An accelerating corrosion of the social fabric.

The extreme polarisation of Venezuelan Society was a reality long before Chávez, but has been reinforced by both sides during this period. The economic collapse undermines collective resolve and the two features have meant a corroded social fabric, that is, the values and norms that enable a society to function, securing safety and support for its members, irrespective of formal State and market arrangements. In the struggle to get by, al manner of practices occur from pilfering and resale of subsidised products to involvement in violent crime. The inconsistency of distribution of State benefits makes matters worse, so people fall back on individual and competitive tactics. A study by the Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida de la Población Venezolana, an initiative of three Venezuelan Universities in the absence of reliable government statistics22, found that 87% of the population (the same proportion now in conditions of poverty, according to the same study) have access to subsidised food (mostly carbohydrates) and 67% get this at least once a month in Caracas. Elsewhere more than 50% receive it with an “undefined” frequency. As the proportion of those receiving food support has increased, the other social missions have declined. For example the primary care programme, Barrio Adentro, largely staffed by Cuban and Cuban-trained doctors served 2.6M people in 2015 but by February 2018 was only serving 0.2M. They concluded that by 2017, to all intents and purposes there was only one effective mission, the CLAP23, supplying subsidised foodstuffs. There is a striking difference with the experience in Cuba. After the counter-revolutions in the former soviet countries, Cuba lost some 80% of its foreign trade and suffered extreme hardship, yet the population were, if anything healthier during that period and there was little or no collapse in social solidarity. This is in part due to the greater political consciousness there, a legacy of the revolution, and a far more organised, effective and self-reflective government, supported by broadly democratic mass organisations. While corruption was a problem, it tended to be manifest at a petty level, so need to resolver, whereby pretty much everyone was involved in some way in activities of dubious legality, did not lead to the kind of corrosion and collapse of social fabric that Venezuela experienced.

6) A lack of reflection and self-criticism and an increasing and unconstitutional authoritarianism on the part of the government24.

Lander argues that over the course of the governments of Chávez and Maduro, there has been an increasing marginalisation and rejection of critical voices. This is evident in the Leninist model of the ruling party (with democratic centralism as one of its principles) and in the practice in expelling critics. This is counter-productive since it reduces the scope for learning from friendly critics and from experience.

Under Maduro, there has been an increasingly authoritarian approach that has now crossed the line into unconstitutionality. In the 2015 National Assembly election, the opposition MUD gained a two thirds majority (with 56.26% of the vote). This meant that the opposition could nominate members of the Supreme Court, the National Electoral Commission and approve legislation without negotiation with the government. This meant a potential duality of powers, presenting something of a constitutional crisis. The Maduro government, rather than accepting this situation and negotiating with the opposition, opted to maintain its power, and this meant both resorting to unconstitutional means and failing to recognise the inconvenient electoral result. Firstly, a few days after the election, the government nominated new magistrates. These new appointees then declared the results of the elections in Amazonas State invalid, depriving the opposition of its majority. Months passed without new elections so the National Assembly decided to accept the representatives whose election had been questioned. At this point the Supreme Court, declared the National Assembly in contempt, rendering any of its decisions invalid. This meant a concentration of powers in the Executive without the checks and balances of the legislature. In February 2016, Maduro declared a state of economic emergency, giving him the power of rule by presidential decree. This was what enabled the declaration of the Orinoco Mineral Arc, discussed above. The government was able to succesfully impede the call for a predidential recall referendum in 2016, despite the petitioners having complied with the constitutional requirements. Finally, in May, 2017, Maduro convened a new “Constituent Assembly” with what could be described as a gerrymandered government majority, to replace the National Assembly. The opposition refused to participate in the elections to it and it has the role of approving government decisions, normally by acclamation and unanimity.

7) A relentless campaign of destabilisation from external and internal opponents.

If the analysis presented here has been critical of the Venezuelan government and the Bolivarian process in general, we must be far more critical of those who, from the start, have sought to demolish what was, after all, a brave experiment in achieving social justice at national scale. Moreover, the Western liberal press has been unfairly critical of the Bolivarian process and indulgent of the far right throughout25. Even generally left of centre newspapers like the Guardian have joined the fray, publishing de-contextualised and one-sided pieces, most notoriously in the case of the reportage by their one time Latin America reporter, Rory Carrol26.

The Venezuelan upper middle class has been unwaveringly hostile, resorting from the start to illegal and violent means to overthrow the government. The unsuccessful 2002 coup, supported by the USA, actually strengthened Chávez but they did not stop there, using the new democratic provisions of Venezuela’s constitution to try to recall the President and failing miserably. Then they cried Fraud! but every election during the Chávez years has been conducted with a transparency and fairness that puts US and UK representative democracy to shame. The Carter Foundation and other international observers have concurred with this. It is true that the government controls the State broadcaster, but private channels dominate the airwaves and they have broadcast unceasing anti-government propaganda. Even when the opposition stood a good chance of defeating Maduro, in April 2018, they decided not to contest the presidential election, whose date had been negotiated with them, under the auspices of former Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, leaving the field to Maduro and a former Chávez ally, Hector Falcón.27

There has been hoarding and disruption of supplies on the part of business interests, tactics reminiscent of the lead up to the 1973 coup in Chile. The opposition forces have also mounted violent acts, including assaults on government premises and the widespread use of barricades and intimidation in the streets. Individuals who are apparently Chavista, on grounds of colour, dress, mode of transport, have been beaten up and in some cases killed. During the upheavals of 2017, a majority of deaths were the result of opposition violence28.

All the US regimes since Chávez was elected have sought an end to the Bolivarian experiment29. Among other reasons, Venezuela has been a lifeline to Cuba and it also supported other left governments in the region. As a major source of oil, it was of great strategic interest to the US. Tactics have included the funding of opposition groups through USAid and a variety of front organisations – imagine if a socialist country were to fund opposition groups and parties in a Western democracy. It is arguable that the US fracking boom, which has contributed to the oil price drop, was part of a geopolitical strategy to undermine key oil producing states that the US disapproved of. And who knows whether the conspiracy theories about the poisoning of Chávez and other leftist leaders have any foundation. In August, 2018, Maduro was the target of an unsuccesful assassination attempt by drone. The New Yorker magazine gave some credence to the claim that the USA was involved30.

However, it is the sanctions against Venezuela that could prove the most damaging. Just before leaving office, Obama renewed an order that declared “a national emergency with respect to the situation in Venezuela”31. Trump has speculated on the possibility of a military invasion32 and the White House then refused a telephone call from Maduro. In August 2017, sanctions were declared. These, like those of the blockade of Cuba are extraterritorial in nature, constraining financial institutions and companies in third countries. This means, for example, that Venezuela has had its accounts with banks in a number of countries closed in fear of US fines and other sanctions. This obviously makes it difficult for Venezuela to get the necessary credit for purchases, even of vital things like food and medicines. The object is to make the country ungovernable and create unrest among the population. This, of course, is the usual practice of the USA when any country demonstrates independence, especially when it is seen as a potential good example for others (not that Venezuela can any long claim such a status).


The Bolivarian process launched by President Hugo Chávez showed that it was possible to pursue the goals of social and economic justice in the context of representative democracy. The new constitution increased democracy and recognised the country’s indigenous peoples. It also stated the goal of environmental protection. In the early years there was significant investment in social programmes that brought real benefits to Venezuela’s poor. Venezuela’s example was also an inspiration to social movements and progressives across Latin America and beyond. New international institutions were established and poorer countries’ social programmes were subsidised. This was all in the face of relentless opposition that extended to illegal and violent acts, including the failed 2002 coup and the PDVSA lock-out. The popularity of Chávez and the Bolivarian process among the majority of the population was confirmed by his victory in the recall referendum and in a series of elections.

However, the Bolivarian process rested on the continuation of Venezuela’s dependence on oil exports. This distorted economy predated 1998 by decades but the skew towards oil was intensified under Chávez. No serious attempt was made to secure a transition to a more balanced economy and the country benefited from the high oil prices of the first decade of the century. However, Venezuela’s oil was increasingly a liability, with a high break-even price and a declining return on investment. Despite its leftist image the government’s policies were largely social-democratic in nature, using the oil revenues to fund ameliorative programmes but not changing the fundamental capitalist economic and social relations, except through a series of nationalisations, typically of failing enterprises and the promotion of co-operatives, at the margins.

The failure to address the structural weakness of the economy and its dependence on extractivist exports became apparent when the global oil price dropped from 2013. This coincided with the untimely death of Chávez. Poor policy choices in financial management with an overvalued Bolivar at a series of fixed exchange rates, exacerbated the problems and contributed, along with the almost free supply of petrol (which benefited middle class car drivers more than the masses), to the diversion of resources into contraband trade. The government increased its attempt to ramp up the extractive economy with disastrous consequences for the environment, indigenous peoples and an upsurge of organised crime, linked to informal and dangerous mining.

The economic crisis deepened from 2014 onwards and Maduro’s lacklustre leadership was indecisive and ineffective in responding to it and to the political haemorrhaging of popular support. Authoritarian tendencies, already identifiable under Chávez, were intensified and the government engaged in a series of unconstitutional moves. Meanwhile a humanitarian crisis, characterised by shortages and the collapse of health and social services, took root.

Throughout, the right wing opposition, with support from the USA, has taken every opportunity to sabotage the country, and it appears that they will only be satisfied with its total collapse and the end of the Bolivarian experiment.

There are a number of lessons for socialists, and not just in Latin America.

Firstly, constitutional reform is of no value unless it is then respected and followed through with a deepening of democracy.

Secondly, dependence on globalised chains of extraction and supply means a vulnerable economy: every effort has to be made to ensure a diversified and resilient economy, and one that does not destroy the natural world on which all life depends.

Thirdly, socialism must be more than the paternalistic distribution of part of the surplus of an undisturbed capitalist accumulation process: it is necessary to change the fundamental model of accumulation and distribution, and this means finding an appropriate balance between State, market and the social economy.

Fourthly, a sound financial strategy is vital given the vulnerability of national economies and currencies to global shocks and the machinations of hostile governments and financial interests33.

Fifthly, the international left needs to balance its solidarity with fair criticism. We have to oppose the imperialist destabilisation and internal oligarchic sabotage without falling into the trap of turning a blind eye to abuses by left governments.

1 Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. See

2 In Latin America, the term “pensamiento único” is used to capture the idea of the ideological conformity of this US-dominated system at the supposed “end of history”.

5 In these two articles: Lander, E. (2018). Venezuela: el fracaso del proceso bolivariano. and Lander, E. (2017). Venezuela: la experiencia bolivariana en la lucha por trascender al capitalismo. and
For an older article in English, see Lander, E. (2014). Venezuela: terminal crisis of the rentier petro-state? , from
Lander does acknowledge the positive achievements of the Bolivarian project, especially before 2014. He was initially more supportive : Lander, E. (2011). The discourse of civil society and current decolonisation struggles in South America. In J. Heine & R. C. Thakur (Eds.), The dark side of globalization. New York: United Nations University Press. Retrieved from

6 Central Bank of Venezuela statistics, cited by Lander, 2017.

7 Also see for a criticism of both the government’s failure to move beyond the oil rent model and the bureaucratic barriers faced by agricultural coops.

10 e.g. Fahey, M. (2015, December 3). Oil prices and budgets:The OPEC countries most at risk. Retrieved January 3, 2019, from

12  OPEC. Monthly Oil Market Report December 2018, Vienna, December 2018.

13 Lander (2017) – see note 5.

15 For a fuller analysis of the traps of the neo-extractivism of he Latin American left governments, see Acosta, A., & Brand, U. (2017). Salidas del laberinto capitalista: decrecimiento y postextractivismo. Barcelona: Icaria.
Brand, U., & Wissen, M. (2018). The limits to capitalist nature: theorizing and overcoming the imperial mode of living. London ; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.
Gudynas, E. (2017). Value, Growth, Development: South American Lessons for a New Ecopolitics. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 1–10.

16 Cusack, see note 3.

20 As Richard Murphy, a post-Keynesian economist, critical of Venezuela points out:

21 Lander, 2018. See note 5.

23 Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción. (Local suppply and production committees. These function primarily through institutions of the governing Unified Popular Socialist Party such as the Unidades de Batalla Bolívar-Chávez (UBCH) and the Frente Francisco de Miranda.

24 The account here draws on Lander’s two articles cited at note 5.

31 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Notice. Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Venezuela, Washington, 13 Jan., 2017. []

33 This latter has been a significant issue in Argentina. One thing that can be learned from the Ecuadorian experience is the use of the citizen’s debt audit to make transparent and resist this injustice:

Postscript: additional sources following Guaidó’s self proclamation.

  1. Venezuela’s collapse is a window into how the Oil Age will unravel. By Nafeez Ahmed.  Patreon/Medium  31 January.
  2.  What Is Going on in Venezuela? By Aaron Bastani. Novara Media, 28 January.
  3. The Making of Juan Guaidó: How the US Regime Change Laboratory Created Venezuela’s Coup Leader.  By Dan Cohen and Max Blumenthal. Gray Zone, 29 January.
  4. In support of a democratic solution, by and for the Venezuelan people. Les invités de Mediapart with 120 initial endorsements from intellectuals, journalist, activists and others from across the continent. Mediapart, 29 January.
  5. Do Right-wing Governments ‘Have the Stomach’ for Post-Coup Chaos in Venezuela? Interview with Guillaume Long, former Foreign Minister of Ecuador.  TeleSur, 29 January.
Posted in economics, Latin America | Tagged , , | 1 Comment

Degrowth, divestment, politics

The red snail from degrowth

Updated: 7 September, 2018

In addition to the Left Foot Forward piece below, I’ve published seveal other related pieces:

  1. Practical degrowth for Labour (fuller version).  Published as The Case For Degrowth?

(not my question mark!) on the SERA blog.

2) Divesting from Fossil Fuels: a public health action, published on the Socialist Health Association blog.

3) A longer piece on these themes – essentially exploring the hypothesis that degrowth/post-growth is now at last beginning to enter the mainstream of left political discourse and what that might mean for thinkers and activists.
Is the UK Labour party facing up to a post-growth future?

4) My paper for the Malmö International Degrowth conference, August 2018.  Here I identified an eclipsed degrowth-like tradition in the British labour and socialist movement, contrasting it with the dominant, productivist (i.e. growthist) orthodoxy and made connections between that, the modern degrowth movement and the ferment of ideas as neoliberalism loses its grip on Labour.  SlidesText.

5) Further articles drawing on these sources should appear in other publications soon.

Posted in Uncategorized | 3 Comments

Could Labour implement a post-growth economy?

Here is the full version of the article published, in rather truncated form today, on Left Foot Forward. I will be posting a fully referenced extended version in the near future.

pdf version of the full text

Could Labour implement a post-growth economy?

Earlier this month, John McDonnell gave a remarkable speech to the IPPR who had asked him to address the economy after Brexit. But John went much further in speaking

John McDonnell

John McDonnell By Rwendland (Own work) [CC BY-SA 4.0 (, via Wikimedia Commons

of a context that is both wider and more fundamental. For perhaps the first time, a leading Labour politician has acknowledged that the pursuit of economic growth is itself problematic and the reason is the ecological and climate crisis that threatens the very basis for any kind of economy, and indeed for human society itself.

This is what he said:

“At the most abstract, the problem we face can be stated very simply. Every 1% added to global GDP over the last century has meant, on average, adding 0.5% to carbon dioxide emissions. As the size of the world economy has grown, so too has the pressure it places on our ecosystems. The consequences of that pressure are now becoming all too apparent. …. On current trends we are heading for a 3.5 degree celsius increase in global temperatures this century; a rise that would wreck everyone’s economy. This isn’t only about climate change. Other fundamental natural systems are at risk.”

These lines wouldn’t have been out of place at an International Degrowth Conference.

But he then spoilt it with a standard, technologically optimistic “green growth” policy perspective, which goes against evidence that the material demand and impact of the economy cannot be significantly reduced while it grows. This is so both for the very deep carbon emission reductions we need and for the demand on other raw materials.

What might it look like if Labour were to seriously adopt the principle of an economy that doesn’t have to keep growing? Could it be realistic? I think so.

Some sectors will have to grow, the “replacement economy” of socially and environmentally benign production. Much of Labour’s economic and industrial approach is relevant and appropriate to this. But it is only ecologically realistic if the aggregate level of resource throughput decreases and then stays stable: it can’t be done in an economy that is growing overall.

Dumping the mantra of “growth” means devising and securing support for unprecedented and innovative policies. Our group, Steady State Manchester, has explored them at the level of the city region in some detail. At the national level, a start could be made with the following (where I’ve built on suggestions by Giorgos Kallis and colleagues of the Research and Degrowth Group).

1. Stop subsidizing and investing in activities that are highly polluting, moving liberated public funds towards clean production.

2. Sharing work-and resources, reducing the working week to some 32 hours, supporting employers to facilitate job-sharing, with income loss for the top 10% only.

3. Minimum and maximum income. High incomes mean disproportionate resource use: cap them but also set a floor.

4. Tax reform for a progressive system that taxes use of energy and resources, wealth, property and land value.

5. Control money creation ,regulating bank lending for tight but cheap credit.

6. Citizen debt audit: “pardon” unpayable household debts.

7. Support the alternative, solidarity society through subsidies and tax exemptions for co-operatives, social enterprises, community land trusts, opening up resources to community groups.

8. Optimise buildings. Establish a hierarchy from expropriation of vacant housing, incentives to down-size and share, prioritising retrofitting and refurbishment, and then respond to any remaining need by building low energy social housing, within already urbanised areas. Invest in a jobs-generating deep retrofit programme, saving fuel costs and emissions.

9. Curb advertising, reducing the incessant promotion of consumption.

10. Establish environmental limits, via absolute and diminishing caps on the CO2 that can be produced and the material resources the country uses, including emissions and materials embedded in imported products.

11. Abolish the misleading GDP indicator. Focus on real things- jobs, incomes, activity, investment, care, health, wellbeing and environmental restoration. McDonnell proposes that the OBR include the impact of climate change and environmental damage in its long-term forecasts – that’s a start.

This isn’t a full programme for a steady state economy but it demonstrates how, far from suggesting something impractical and unpopular, Labour could and should promote a genuinely ecological literate and socialist approach: degrowth.

Mark H Burton

…. is a member of the Steady State Manchester collective, a Labour Party member and divestment activist.

Posted in climate change, ecology, economics, ideology | Tagged , , , , , , | 3 Comments

After peak capitalism: the livelihood challenge – revised version

Here is the revised version of my working paper, “After peak capitalism: the livelihood challenge“.  I’m grateful to those who have offered encouragement and constructively critical comments. 

This new version,

  1. Has numerous improvements to the text and further references to substantiate or situate (or rhetorically inflate?!) points made.
  2. Adds another crucial objection, national welfarism and imperialism, to the various strategies that are criticised.
  3. Finishes with a new sketch of a “better collapse” in the context of the post-industrial parts of North West England.

Click for the article (pdf)


The former industrial towns of the global North have already seen capitalism
peak locally. Globally we may be living through a similar peaking as the
system exhausts both its options to fix its internal contradictions, and more
critically, the capacity of the planetary systems that sustain it. This essay
begins with the first sense of peak capitalism and moves on to the second.
Strategies, mainstream and alternative for economic and social restoration,
are criticised the context of the relentless expansion of global capitalism that,
having created these places in conjunction with colonial pillage, has now
moved on. It is suggested that the reform strategies, whether proposed by
mainstream or critically inclined bodies and campaigners, is inadequate to
scale of the challenge posed by footloose capital. Moreover, such strategies,
insofar as they require growth in the material scale of the economy, are
ecologically illiterate and will both hasten and be rendered powerless by the
coming resource and climate crisis and catastrophe. Given this picture, the
counsel of the degrowth and similar movements, North and South, to live
better with less, makes sense, as practice and as policy. Given that a global
economic and social collapse will happen, the only policy and practice
approaches that make sense today are those that provide scalable resources
that will aid (but not guarantee) communities to make a livelihood under
turbulent and harsh conditions. Helpful guidance can be found from
permacultural thinking on materially and socially retrofitting urban and
suburban human settlements.
Read the working paper by clicking here.

Posted in climate change, ecology, economics, policy | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Brief notes on Catalonia

Flag of the Second Spanish Republic: a plague on both your houses!

Having friends in Barcelona and liking the city and region, as well as Spain in general, the situation in Catalonia causes me a lot of concern.  A lot of the commentary here oversimplifies the situation with some on the left, who should know better, characterising it as a simple matter of self determination and struggle for freedom.  If only it were that simple.  Here are some brief observations.
1) Independence is probably not supported by a majority of people living in Catalonia although it is difficult to tell.  The recent referendum took place under conditions of duress from the Spanish authorities with astonishing levels of violence from the Guardia Civil in particular.  But it also seems likely that a lot of people who oppose independence did not vote, not wanting to give legitimacy to the process.  A rigorous opinion survey in March showed that a majority (63%) think that Catalonia has insufficient autonomy but only 37% supported full independence.  However the independence sentiment was rising.
2) Given the clear desire of a majority for more autonomy, there should be a referendum to test this and the action of the governing right wing Partido Popular (PP), supported by the PSOE  (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Part – sic) at their coat-tails, in blocking it can only increase the support for independence, as do the fascist era style violent actions of the two national police forces under PP direction.
3) A motley collection of parties support independence – the right have consistently used it as a distraction from austerity policies while the maximalist left mostly seem to think it will mean Keynesianism (or even socialism) in one “country”. Much of the motivation  for independence has the ugly tone of economic privilege, rather like the Right Wing Northern League in Italy. But like our own London and the South East, Catalonia should subsidise the poorer regions. It’s basic socialist redistribution.
4) It seems that only Podemos and its allies (e.g. Barcelona en Comú) have any kind of a sensible position on this in their call for a national constitutional referendum orientated to a federal model, with as well as for dialogue with mediation. They largely oppose independence but respect the right of self determination (unlike the independistas who want to take the populace out of Spain whether they like it or not).
5) Both the nationalist sides (Catalan and Spanish) are playing with fire. Catalonia is a multi-cultural polity like former Yugoslavia. We know what happened there (and comparisons with the relatively peaceful Slovenian secession are disingenuous).  Spain, like former Yugoslavia is a plurinational state with considerable mixing of populations, including the many from the poorer regions who have settled in and raised families in the wealthier parts.  Nationalism, as opposed to regional government (based on the principle of subsidiarity), should be opposed by leftists and republicans.

My own hope is for a mutual backing off from confrontation and an agreement to call elections to both reset the mandate for the Catalan parliament and test the strength of support for greater autonomy.   Meanwhile I hope that the minority and PSOE-supported PP government in Madrid falls soon.

Finally, on the margins of the debate, there has been a more promising development: Sergie Saladié, a deputy from the CUP (actually one of the left parties criticised above for their maximalist separatist stance) introduced a debate on degrowth.  This is probably a first for a political party and it is heartening to see the rejection of Juan Carlos Monedero’s widely quoted suggestion that degrowth means electoral death, a myth recycled, along with other misrepresentations, by the UK Labour Party’s Chi Onwurah in a polemic in the SERA magazine New Ground. We translated an interview with Saladié and an analysis of the debate on the Steady State Manchester website.

Posted in politics, Spain | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

After peak capitalism: the livelihood challenge.

Note: there is now a revised version.  See this later post.

This is my new working paper. It attempts to deal with the question of peak capitalism and ecological crisis on two levels – the post-industrial wastelands of the core capitalist countries and the global exhaustion and toxicity of capitalism as a system for appropriation, commodification and accumulation. It has an explicit degrowth perspective and asks the question, how adequate are policy proposals, mainstream and alternative in this challenging context. Finally it suggests that a criterion for their adequacy might be their relevance to a “better collapse” of “civilisation”. Obviously it is a working paper, exploring, thinking aloud questions for which there is no adequate answer, but possibly suggesting a compass rather than a roadmap.

NEW: I’ve also uploaded it to the site where I’ve invited readers to join the discussion and comment on the paper.

After peak capitalism: the livelihood challenge.

download (revised version)

Mark H Burton


The former industrial towns of the global North have already seen capitalism peak locally. Globally we may be living through a similar peaking as the system exhausts both its options to fix its internal contradictions, and more critically, the capacity of the planetary systems that sustain it. This essay begins with the first sense of peak capitalism and moves on to the second. Strategies, mainstream and alternative, for economic and social restoration, are criticised in the context of the relentless expansion of global capitalism that, having created these places in conjunction with colonial pillage, has now moved on. It is suggested that the reform strategies, whether proposed by mainstream or critically inclined bodies and campaigners, are inadequate to the scale of the challenge posed by footloose capital. Moreover, such strategies, insofar as they require growth in the material scale of the economy, are ecologically illiterate and will both hasten and be rendered powerless by the coming resource and climate crisis and catastrophe. Given this picture, the counsel of the degrowth and similar movements, North and South, to live better with less, makes sense, as practice and as policy. Given that a global economic and social collapse will happen, the only policy and practice approaches that make sense today are those that provide scalable resources that will aid (but not guarantee) communities to make a livelihood under turbulent and harsh conditions. Helpful guidance can be found from permacultural thinking on materially and socially retrofitting urban and suburban human settlements.

Read the (revised) working paper.

Posted in climate change, ecology, economics, policy | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

How much greenhouse gas has been emitted in your lifetime?

This simple tool allows you to calculate how much annual global emissions have increased since a certain date, e.g. your year of birth.

It also calculates the proportion of all time cumulative global emissions during your lifetime. It also shows this in a simple bar graph.

The data set is the freely available spreadsheet file from using data from the US Oak Ridge laboratory.

Note that this web resource will be removed as a result of the present US regime’s climate denialist policy but it will still be available at The full citation is

To use the tool, open the tab “Emissions since date” and enter the desired date in the box with yellow highlighting. Click here for the global carbon emissions tool.

The file might download as “read only”, in which case use “save as” where upon you can enter your own birth or other key date – try 1997, the year of the Kyoto accord, or 1992 the year of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, for example.

bar chart

The gaphical output looks like this.






















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